WinnerImposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
 Dimitris Fotakis,
 Christos Tzamos
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Abstract
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents’ locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her location, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost. We focus on the closely related problems of kFacility Location and Facility Location with a uniform facility opening cost, and mostly study winnerimposing mechanisms, which allocate facilities to the agents and require that each agent allocated a facility should connect to it. We show that the winnerimposing version of the Proportional Mechanism (Lu et al., EC ’10) is stategyproof and 4kapproximate for the kFacility Location game. For the Facility Location game, we show that the winnerimposing version of the randomized algorithm of (Meyerson, FOCS ’01), which has an approximation ratio of 8, is strategyproof. Furthermore, we present a deterministic nonimposing group strategyproof O(logn)approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game on the line.
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 Title
 WinnerImposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
 Book Title
 Internet and Network Economics
 Book Subtitle
 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 1317, 2010. Proceedings
 Pages
 pp 234245
 Copyright
 2010
 DOI
 10.1007/9783642175725_19
 Print ISBN
 9783642175718
 Online ISBN
 9783642175725
 Series Title
 Lecture Notes in Computer Science
 Series Volume
 6484
 Series ISSN
 03029743
 Publisher
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Copyright Holder
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Industry Sectors
 eBook Packages
 Editors

 Amin Saberi ^{(16)}
 Editor Affiliations

 16. Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University
 Authors

 Dimitris Fotakis ^{(17)}
 Christos Tzamos ^{(17)}
 Author Affiliations

 17. School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, 157 80, Athens, Greece
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