Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions
- Cite this paper as:
- Christodoulou G., Elbassioni K., Fouz M. (2010) Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions. In: Saberi A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space Open image in new window, and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in Open image in new window, each bidder j declares her bid Open image in new window. We give a deterministic truthful mechanism, when the valuations are single-minded: when Open image in new window is a collection of fat objects (respectively, axis-aligned rectangles) in the plane, there is a truthful mechanism with a 1 + ε- (respectively, ⌈logn⌉)-approximation of the social welfare (where n is an upper bound on the maximum integral coordinate of each rectangle). We also consider the non-single-minded case, and design a randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism with approximation guarantee O(1) (respectively, O(logm)).
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