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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6006))

Abstract

The paper studies the interrelationships between the social-theoretic problems of preference and judgment aggregation from the perspective of formal logic. The result of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, preference aggregation on total preorders is proven equivalent to the aggregation of specific types of judgments. On the other hand, judgment aggregation on propositional logic is proven equivalent to the aggregation of specific types of preferences. This shows how the aggregation of preferences and judgments can be viewed, in fact, as the two faces of a same coin.

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Grossi, D. (2010). Correspondences in the Theory of Aggregation. In: Bonanno, G., Löwe, B., van der Hoek, W. (eds) Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory – LOFT 8. LOFT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15164-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15164-4_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15163-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-15164-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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