Securing Computation against Continuous Leakage
- Shafi GoldwasserAffiliated withWeizmann Institute of Science and MIT
- , Guy N. RothblumAffiliated withPrinceton University
We present a general method to compile any cryptographic algorithm into one which resists side channel attacks of the only computation leaks information variety for an unbounded number of executions. Our method uses as a building block a semantically secure subsidiary bit encryption scheme with the following additional operations: key refreshing, oblivious generation of cipher texts, leakage resilience re-generation, and blinded homomorphic evaluation of one single complete gate (e.g. NAND). Furthermore, the security properties of the subsidiary encryption scheme should withstand bounded leakage incurred while performing each of the above operations.
We show how to implement such a subsidiary encryption scheme under the DDH intractability assumption and the existence of a simple secure hardware component. The hardware component is independent of the encryption scheme secret key. The subsidiary encryption scheme resists leakage attacks where the leakage is computable in polynomial time and of length bounded by a constant fraction of the security parameter.
- Securing Computation against Continuous Leakage
- Book Title
- Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010
- Book Subtitle
- 30th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. Proceedings
- pp 59-79
- Print ISBN
- Online ISBN
- Series Title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Series Volume
- Series ISSN
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Copyright Holder
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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