Annual Cryptology Conference

CRYPTO 2010: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010 pp 59-79

Securing Computation against Continuous Leakage

  • Shafi Goldwasser
  • Guy N. Rothblum
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_4

Volume 6223 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Goldwasser S., Rothblum G.N. (2010) Securing Computation against Continuous Leakage. In: Rabin T. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2010. CRYPTO 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6223. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We present a general method to compile any cryptographic algorithm into one which resists side channel attacks of the only computation leaks information variety for an unbounded number of executions. Our method uses as a building block a semantically secure subsidiary bit encryption scheme with the following additional operations: key refreshing, oblivious generation of cipher texts, leakage resilience re-generation, and blinded homomorphic evaluation of one single complete gate (e.g. NAND). Furthermore, the security properties of the subsidiary encryption scheme should withstand bounded leakage incurred while performing each of the above operations.

We show how to implement such a subsidiary encryption scheme under the DDH intractability assumption and the existence of a simple secure hardware component. The hardware component is independent of the encryption scheme secret key. The subsidiary encryption scheme resists leakage attacks where the leakage is computable in polynomial time and of length bounded by a constant fraction of the security parameter.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shafi Goldwasser
    • 1
  • Guy N. Rothblum
    • 2
  1. 1.Weizmann Institute of Science and MIT 
  2. 2.Princeton University