International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography

PQCrypto 2010: Post-Quantum Cryptography pp 95-107

A Timing Attack against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC

  • Falko Strenzke
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2_8

Volume 6061 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Strenzke F. (2010) A Timing Attack against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece PKC. In: Sendrier N. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6061. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

In this work we present a novel timing attack against the McEliece public key cryptosystem (PKC). In contrast to former works investigating timing attacks that aim at recovering the message, we devise how to exploit a vulnerability in the Patterson algorithm that allows the attacker to gather information about the secret permutation through a timing side channel. This information can be used to dramatically reduce the cost of a brute force attack against the secret key. We also describe the results obtained from a proof of concept implementation of the attack and give an appropriate countermeasure.

Keywords

side channel attack timing attack post quantum cryptography code-based cryptography 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Falko Strenzke
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.FlexSecure GmbHGermany
  2. 2.Cryptography and Computeralgebra, Department of Computer ScienceTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany