The Coremelt Attack

  • Ahren Studer
  • Adrian Perrig
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04444-1_3

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5789)
Cite this paper as:
Studer A., Perrig A. (2009) The Coremelt Attack. In: Backes M., Ning P. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2009. ESORICS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5789. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Current Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are directed towards a specific victim. The research community has devised several countermeasures that protect the victim host against undesired traffic.

We present Coremelt, a new attack mechanism, where attackers only send traffic between each other, and not towards a victim host. As a result, none of the attack traffic is unwanted. The Coremelt attack is powerful because among N attackers, there are O(N2) connections, which cause significant damage in the core of the network. We demonstrate the attack based on simulations within a real Internet topology using realistic attacker distributions and show that attackers can induce a significant amount of congestion.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ahren Studer
    • 1
  • Adrian Perrig
    • 1
  1. 1.Carnegie Mellon UniversityUSA

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