Reliable Evidence: Auditability by Typing

  • Nataliya Guts
  • Cédric Fournet
  • Francesco Zappa Nardelli
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-04444-1_11

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5789)
Cite this paper as:
Guts N., Fournet C., Zappa Nardelli F. (2009) Reliable Evidence: Auditability by Typing. In: Backes M., Ning P. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2009. ESORICS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5789. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Many protocols rely on audit trails to allow an impartial judge to verify a posteriori some property of a protocol run. However, in current practice the choice of what data to log is left to the programmer’s intuition, and there is no guarantee that it constitutes enough evidence. We give a precise definition of auditability and we show how typechecking can be used to statically verify that a protocol always logs enough evidence. We apply our approach to several examples, including a full-scale auction-like protocol programmed in ML.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nataliya Guts
    • 1
  • Cédric Fournet
    • 2
    • 1
  • Francesco Zappa Nardelli
    • 3
    • 1
  1. 1.MSR-INRIA Joint CentreFrance
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchUSA
  3. 3.INRIAFrance

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