Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)

  • Silvio Micali
  • abhi shelat
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5444)
Cite this paper as:
Micali S., shelat . (2009) Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract). In: Reingold O. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5444. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Rational secret sharing is a problem at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer’s secret. Yet, all solutions proposed so far did not rely solely on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs, and were also quite inefficient.

After providing a more complete definition of the problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it with a verifiable trusted channel.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Silvio Micali
    • 1
  • abhi shelat
    • 2
  1. 1.MIT CSAIL 
  2. 2.U. Virginia 

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