A New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher

  • Orr Dunkelman
  • Nathan Keller
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-89255-7_33

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5350)
Cite this paper as:
Dunkelman O., Keller N. (2008) A New Attack on the LEX Stream Cipher. In: Pieprzyk J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2008. ASIACRYPT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5350. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

In [6], Biryukov presented a new methodology of stream cipher design, called leak extraction. The stream cipher LEX, based on this methodology and on the AES block cipher, was selected to phase 3 of the eSTREAM competition. The suggested methodology seemed promising, and LEX, due to its elegance, simplicity and performance was expected to be selected to the eSTREAM portfolio.

In this paper we present a key recovery attack on LEX. The attack requires about 236.3 bytes of key-stream produced by the same key (possibly under many different IVs), and retrieves the secret key in time of 2112 simple operations. Following a preliminary version of our attack, LEX was discarded from the final portfolio of eSTREAM.

Keywords

LEX AES stream cipher design 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Orr Dunkelman
    • 1
  • Nathan Keller
    • 2
  1. 1.École Normale SupérieureDépartement d’Informatique, CNRS, INRIAParisFrance
  2. 2.Einstein Institute of MathematicsHebrew UniversityJerusalemIsrael

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