Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems

  • Peter R. Lewis
  • Paul Marrow
  • Xin Yao
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-87700-4_106

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5199)
Cite this paper as:
Lewis P.R., Marrow P., Yao X. (2008) Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems. In: Rudolph G., Jansen T., Beume N., Lucas S., Poloni C. (eds) Parallel Problem Solving from Nature – PPSN X. PPSN 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5199. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers.

Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe.

Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.

Keywords

decentralised systems market-based control co-evolution load-balancing self-interested agents 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter R. Lewis
    • 1
  • Paul Marrow
    • 1
    • 2
  • Xin Yao
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK
  2. 2.BT Group plcAdastral ParkUK

Personalised recommendations