Lewis P.R., Marrow P., Yao X. (2008) Evolutionary Market Agents for Resource Allocation in Decentralised Systems. In: Rudolph G., Jansen T., Beume N., Lucas S., Poloni C. (eds) Parallel Problem Solving from Nature – PPSN X. PPSN 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5199. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
We introduce self-interested evolutionary market agents, which act on behalf of service providers in a large decentralised system, to adaptively price their resources over time. Our agents competitively co-evolve in the live market, driving it towards the Bertrand equilibrium, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, at which all sellers charge their reserve price and share the market equally. We demonstrate that this outcome results in even load-balancing between the service providers.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold; the use of on-line competitive co-evolution of self-interested service providers to drive a decentralised market towards equilibrium, and a demonstration that load-balancing behaviour emerges under the assumptions we describe.
Unlike previous studies on this topic, all our agents are entirely self-interested; no cooperation is assumed. This makes our problem a non-trivial and more realistic one.
decentralised systems market-based control co-evolution load-balancing self-interested agents