Volume 4997 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 327-336
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- Shahar DobzinskiAffiliated withThe School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- , Aranyak MehtaAffiliated withGoogle, Inc.
- , Tim RoughgardenAffiliated withDepartment of Computer Science, Stanford University
- , Mukund SundararajanAffiliated withDepartment of Computer Science, Stanford University
Abstract
We study the best guarantees of efficiency approximation achievable by cost-sharing mechanisms. Our main result is the first quantitative lower bound that applies to all truthful cost-sharing mechanisms, including randomized mechanisms that are only truthful in expectation, and only β-budget-balanced in expectation. Our lower bound is optimal up to constant factors and applies even to the simple and central special case of the public excludable good problem. We also give a stronger lower bound for a subclass of deterministic cost-sharing mechanisms, which is driven by a new characterization of the Shapley value mechanism. Finally, we show a separation between the best-possible efficiency guarantees achievable by deterministic and randomized cost-sharing mechanisms.
- Title
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- Book Title
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Book Subtitle
- First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Paderborn, Germany, April 30-May 2, 2008. Proceedings
- Pages
- pp 327-336
- Copyright
- 2008
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_29
- Print ISBN
- 978-3-540-79308-3
- Online ISBN
- 978-3-540-79309-0
- Series Title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Series Volume
- 4997
- Series ISSN
- 0302-9743
- Publisher
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Copyright Holder
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
- Additional Links
- Topics
- Industry Sectors
- eBook Packages
- Editors
-
- Burkhard Monien (1)
- Ulf-Peter Schroeder (1)
- Editor Affiliations
-
- 1. Institut für Informatik, Universität Paderborn
- Authors
-
- Shahar Dobzinski (2)
- Aranyak Mehta (3)
- Tim Roughgarden (4)
- Mukund Sundararajan (4)
- Author Affiliations
-
- 2. The School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
- 3. Google, Inc., Mountain View, CA,
- 4. Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, 353 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA, 94305,
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