Black-Box Construction of a Non-malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One

  • Seung Geol Choi
  • Dana Dachman-Soled
  • Tal Malkin
  • Hoeteck Wee
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_24

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4948)
Cite this paper as:
Choi S.G., Dachman-Soled D., Malkin T., Wee H. (2008) Black-Box Construction of a Non-malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One. In: Canetti R. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4948. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto ’06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt ’07).

Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryptions; instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message with certain locally testable and self-correcting properties. We exploit the fact that low-degree polynomials are simultaneously good error-correcting codes and a secret-sharing scheme.

Keywords

Public-key encryption semantic security non-malleability black-box constructions 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seung Geol Choi
    • 1
  • Dana Dachman-Soled
    • 1
  • Tal Malkin
    • 1
  • Hoeteck Wee
    • 1
  1. 1.Columbia University 

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