International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security

CANS 2007: Cryptology and Network Security pp 265-281

Anonymity 2.0 – X.509 Extensions Supporting Privacy-Friendly Authentication

  • Vicente Benjumea
  • Seung Geol Choi
  • Javier Lopez
  • Moti Yung
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-76969-9_17

Volume 4856 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Benjumea V., Choi S.G., Lopez J., Yung M. (2007) Anonymity 2.0 – X.509 Extensions Supporting Privacy-Friendly Authentication. In: Bao F., Ling S., Okamoto T., Wang H., Xing C. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4856. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We present a semantic extension to X.509 certificates that allows incorporating new anonymity signature schemes into the X.509 framework. This fact entails advantages to both components. On the one hand, anonymous signature schemes benefit from all the protocols and infrastructure that the X.509 framework provides. On the other hand, the X.509 framework incorporates anonymity as a very interesting new feature. This semantic extension is part of a system that provides user’s controlled anonymous authorization under the X.509 framework. Additionally, the proposal directly fits the much active Identity 2.0 effort, where anonymity is a major supplementary feature that increases the self-control of one’s identity and privacy which is at the center of the activity.

Keywords

Anonymous authentication X.509 certificates group signatures ring signatures traceable signatures 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vicente Benjumea
    • 1
  • Seung Geol Choi
    • 2
  • Javier Lopez
    • 1
  • Moti Yung
    • 3
  1. 1.Computer Science Dept., University of MalagaSpain
  2. 2.Computer Science Dept., Columbia UniversityUSA
  3. 3.Google & Computer Science Dept., Columbia UniversityUSA