Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge

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Abstract

We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Divergence Ratio (a kind of subjective Price of Anarchy).

Partially supported by the EU within the 6th Framework Programme under contracts 001907 “Dynamically Evolving, Large Scale Information Systems” (DELIS) and 015964 “Algorithmic Principles for Building Efficient Overlay Computers” (AEOLUS), and by the General Secretariat for Research and Technology of the Greek Ministry of Development within the Programme PENED 2003.