Agent Compatibility and Coalition Formation: Investigating Two Interacting Negotiation Strategies
- Cite this paper as:
- Merida-Campos C., Willmott S. (2007) Agent Compatibility and Coalition Formation: Investigating Two Interacting Negotiation Strategies. In: Fasli M., Shehory O. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Automated Negotiation and Strategy Design for Electronic Markets. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4452. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
This paper focuses on the Coalition Formation paradigm as a market mechanism. Concretely, Coalition Formation occurs as part of a wider open world and may occur many times during the lifetime of a population of agents. This fact can in some circumstances be exploited by agents to re-use existing partial coalition and social relationships over time to improve Coalition Formation efficiency. The aim of the work is to analyze the dynamics of two concrete rational behaviors (Competitive and Conservative strategies) and, in particular, to investigate how agents in a heterogeneous population cluster together across multiple Coalition Formation episodes and varying tasks. Preliminary resuls are also shown regarding the manner in which playing distinct strategies interact with one another.
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