Abstract
We study coordination mechanisms for scheduling n selfish tasks on m identical parallel machines and we focus on the price of anarchy of non-preemptive coordination mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms whose local policies do not delay or preempt tasks. We prove that the price of anarchy of every non-preemptive coordination mechanism for m > 2 is \(\Omega(\frac{\log \log m}{\log \log \log m})\), while for m = 2, we prove a \(\frac{7}{6}\) lower bound. Our lower bounds indicate that it is impossible to produce a non-preemptive coordination mechanism that improves on the currently best known price of anarchy for identical machine scheduling, which is \(\frac{4}{3}-\frac{1}{3m}\).
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Kollias, K. (2008). Non-preemptive Coordination Mechanisms for Identical Machine Scheduling Games. In: Shvartsman, A.A., Felber, P. (eds) Structural Information and Communication Complexity. SIROCCO 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5058. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69355-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69355-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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