Differential Cryptanalysis of TEA and XTEA

  • Seokhie Hong
  • Deukjo Hong
  • Youngdai Ko
  • Donghoon Chang
  • Wonil Lee
  • Sangjin Lee
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_30

Volume 2971 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Hong S., Hong D., Ko Y., Chang D., Lee W., Lee S. (2004) Differential Cryptanalysis of TEA and XTEA. In: Lim JI., Lee DH. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003. ICISC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2971. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

TEA and XTEA are simple block ciphers consisting of exclusive-or, addition, and shift. Although their round functions are very simple and guarantee a little security, large number of 64 rounds have made them secure enough. It seems that the best result for TEA is the related-key attack [3], but it is less reasonable than such attacks for one key as differential and linear attacks. Impossible differential attacks on 12-round TEA and 14-round XTEA are best results except for related-key attack [5]. We suggest differential and truncated differential attacks on TEA and XTEA better than them. Our best results on TEA and XTEA are attacks on 17-round TEA and 23-round XTEA.

Keywords

Block cipher TEA XTEA differential cryptanalysis truncated differential cryptanalysis 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Seokhie Hong
    • 1
  • Deukjo Hong
    • 1
  • Youngdai Ko
    • 1
  • Donghoon Chang
    • 1
  • Wonil Lee
    • 1
  • Sangjin Lee
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST) Korea UniversitySeoulKorea