Abstract
Actors often face challenges demanding bilateral or multilateral cooperation, each with quite different implications. Analytically separating these levels of activity raises the question whether they are driven by similar or different factors. We argue that to answer such questions, one should treat them as interlocking unipartite and bipartite networks, respectively, in a multilevel network. Here we employ multilevel ERGMs to model how bilateral and multilateral fisheries treaties between states, as well as relationships between multilateral treaties, are structured. We find that states prefer either bilateralism or multilateralism and, amongst multilateral treaties, those that are managed or similar.
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Notes
- 1.
This is not a comprehensive list of the ways in which institutions have been defined, but it serves our current purposes. (See Ruggie 1992)
- 2.
Note that the colored node in Fig. 13.2c indicates that the MFA is a secretariat but the uncolored node is unspecified; that is, it may be either a secretariat or not.
- 3.
A subset of 200 out of 225 MFAs were finalized after we dropped those for which we had no structural data – occasionally the case for very old or very new MFAs – or for which we could not collect texts, since the treaties’ texts are important for the construction of the BB network.
- 4.
Convergence statistics were less than 0. 1 in absolute value and there were adequate sample autocorrelations for the statistics.
- 5.
Note that we have fixed the most popular treaties here, so this interpretation references other treaties than, say, UNCLOS or UNFSA.
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Hollway, J., Koskinen, J. (2016). Multilevel Bilateralism and Multilateralism: States’ Bilateral and Multilateral Fisheries Treaties and Their Secretariats. In: Lazega, E., Snijders, T. (eds) Multilevel Network Analysis for the Social Sciences. Methodos Series, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24520-1_13
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