Abstract
We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally over a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost that is a non-decreasing and convex function of the total allocation of that resource. This general model of resource allocation generalizes both singleton congestion games with integer-splittable demands and matroid congestion games with player-specific costs. As our main result, we show that in such general resource allocation problems a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist by giving a pseudo-polynomial algorithm computing a pure Nash equilibrium.
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Harks, T., Klimm, M., Peis, B. (2014). Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids. In: Liu, TY., Qi, Q., Ye, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8877. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_14
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