A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application to Electronic Voting
 Berry Schoenmakers
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Abstract
A publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme is a verifiable secret sharing scheme with the property that the validity of the shares distributed by the dealer can be verified by any party; hence verification is not limited to the respective participants receiving the shares. We present a new construction for PVSS schemes, which compared to previous solutions by Stadler and later by Fujisaki and Okamoto, achieves improvements both in efficiency and in the type of intractability assumptions. The running time is O(nk), where k is a security parameter, and n is the number of participants, hence essentially optimal. The intractability assumptions are the standard DiffieHellman assumption and its decisional variant. We present several applications of our PVSS scheme, among which is a new type of universally verifiable election scheme based on PVSS. The election scheme becomes quite practical and combines several advantages of related electronic voting schemes, which makes it of interest in its own right.
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 Title
 A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application to Electronic Voting
 Book Title
 Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99
 Book Subtitle
 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 15–19, 1999 Proceedings
 Pages
 pp 148164
 Copyright
 1999
 DOI
 10.1007/3540484051_10
 Print ISBN
 9783540663478
 Online ISBN
 9783540484059
 Series Title
 Lecture Notes in Computer Science
 Series Volume
 1666
 Series ISSN
 03029743
 Publisher
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Copyright Holder
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Industry Sectors
 eBook Packages
 Editors

 Michael Wiener ^{(4)}
 Editor Affiliations

 4. Entrust Technologies
 Authors

 Berry Schoenmakers ^{(5)}
 Author Affiliations

 5. Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600, MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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