Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract)

  • Yvo Desmedt
  • Claude Goutier
  • Samy Bengio
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-48184-2_3

Volume 293 of the book series Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)
Cite this paper as:
Desmedt Y., Goutier C., Bengio S. (1988) Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract). In: Pomerance C. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87. CRYPTO 1987. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 293. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

If the physical description of a person would be unique and adequately used and tested, then the security of the Fiat-Shamir scheme is not based on zero-knowledge. Otherwise some new frauds exist. The Feige-Fiat-Shamir scheme always suffers from these bauds. Using an extended notion of subliminal channels, several other undetectable abuses of the Fiat-Shamir protocol, which are not possible with ordinary passports, are discussed. This technique can be used by a terrorist sponsoring country to communicate 500 new words of secret information each time a tourist passport is verified. A non-trivial solution to avoid these subliminal channel problems is presented. The notion of relative zero-knowledge is introduced.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yvo Desmedt
    • 1
  • Claude Goutier
    • 2
  • Samy Bengio
    • 1
  1. 1.Dépt. I.R.O.Université de MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.Centre de calculUniversité de MontréalMontréalCanada