Security Proof for Partial-Domain Hash Signature Schemes

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_39

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2442)
Cite this paper as:
Coron JS. (2002) Security Proof for Partial-Domain Hash Signature Schemes. In: Yung M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2002. CRYPTO 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We study the security of partial-domain hash signature schemes, in which the output size of the hash function is only a fraction of the modulus size. We show that for e = 2 (Rabin), partial-domain hash signature schemes are provably secure in the random oracle model, if the output size of the hash function is larger than 2/3 of the modulus size. This provides a security proof for a variant of the signature standards ISO 9796-2 and PKCS#1 v1.5, in which a larger digest size is used.

Keywords

Signature Schemes Provable Security Random Oracle Model 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
    • 1
  1. 1.Gemplus Card InternationalIssy-les-MoulineauxFrance

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