Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria
 Eyal EvenDar,
 Alex Kesselman,
 Yishay Mansour
 … show all 3 hide
Abstract
We study the number of steps required to reach a pure Nash Equilibrium in a load balancing scenario where each job behaves selfishly and attempts to migrate to a machine which will minimize its cost. We consider a variety of load balancing models, including identical, restricted, related and unrelated machines. Our results have a crucial dependence on the weights assigned to jobs. We consider arbitrary weights, integer weights, K distinct weights and identical (unit) weights. We look both at an arbitrary schedule (where the only restriction is that a job migrates to a machine which lowers its cost) and specific efficient schedulers (such as allowing the largest weight job to move first).
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 Title
 Convergence Time to Nash Equilibria
 Book Title
 Automata, Languages and Programming
 Book Subtitle
 30th International Colloquium, ICALP 2003 Eindhoven, The Netherlands, June 30 – July 4, 2003 Proceedings
 Pages
 pp 502513
 Copyright
 2003
 DOI
 10.1007/3540450610_41
 Print ISBN
 9783540404934
 Online ISBN
 9783540450610
 Series Title
 Lecture Notes in Computer Science
 Series Volume
 2719
 Series ISSN
 03029743
 Publisher
 Springer Berlin Heidelberg
 Copyright Holder
 SpringerVerlag Berlin Heidelberg
 Additional Links
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 Industry Sectors
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 Editors

 Jos C. M. Baeten ^{(1)}
 Jan Karel Lenstra ^{(2)}
 Joachim Parrow ^{(3)}
 Gerhard J. Woeginger ^{(4)}
 Editor Affiliations

 1. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
 2. School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology
 3. Department of Information Technology, Uppsala University
 4. Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Twente
 Authors

 Eyal EvenDar ^{(5)}
 Alex Kesselman ^{(5)}
 Yishay Mansour ^{(5)}
 Author Affiliations

 5. School of Computer Science, TelAviv University, TelAviv
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