Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
- Ran CanettiAffiliated withIBM T.J. Watson Research Center
- , Hugo KrawczykAffiliated withEE Department, Technion
We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links.
We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.
- Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels
- Book Title
- Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2001
- Book Subtitle
- International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques Innsbruck, Austria, May 6–10, 2001 Proceedings
- pp 453-474
- Print ISBN
- Online ISBN
- Series Title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Series Volume
- Series ISSN
- Springer Berlin Heidelberg
- Copyright Holder
- Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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