Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2001

Volume 2045 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 453-474


Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels

  • Ran CanettiAffiliated withIBM T.J. Watson Research Center
  • , Hugo KrawczykAffiliated withEE Department, Technion


We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links.

We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.