Some Characterizations of Convex Games

  • Juan Enrique Martínez-Legaz
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28258-0_18

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 563)
Cite this paper as:
Martínez-Legaz J.E. (2006) Some Characterizations of Convex Games. In: Seeger A. (eds) Recent Advances in Optimization. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 563. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Summary

Several characterizations of convexity for totally balanced games are presented. As a preliminary result, it is first shown that the core of any subgame of a nonnegative totally balanced game can be easily obtained from the maximum average value (MAV) function of the game. This result is then used to get a characterization of convex games in terms of MAV functions. It is also proved that a game is convex if and only if all of its marginal games are totally balanced.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan Enrique Martínez-Legaz
    • 1
  1. 1.Departament d’Economia i d’Història EconòmicaUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterraSpain

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