Repeated Auctions with Complementarities

  • P. J. ’t Hoen
  • J. A. La Poutré
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11888727_2

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3937)
Cite this paper as:
Hoen P.J.., La Poutré J.A. (2006) Repeated Auctions with Complementarities. In: La Poutré H., Sadeh N.M., Janson S. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3937. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

There is an extensive body of literature concerning optimal bidding strategies for agents participating in single shot auctions for single, individually valued goods. However, it remains a largely open question how a bidder should formulate his bidding strategy when there is a sequence of auctions and, furthermore, there are complementarities in the valuation for the bundle of items acquired in the separate auctions. We investigate conditions for which adjusting the bidding horizon beyond the immediate auction is profitable for a bidder. We show how such a strategy, in the limit, reduces agents to zero marginal profits as predicted by the Bertrand economic theory. We support our experimental results by drawing a parallel to the nIPD.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • P. J. ’t Hoen
    • 1
  • J. A. La Poutré
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI)AmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.TU EindhovenEindhovenThe Netherlands

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