Chapter

Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2005

Volume 3788 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science pp 585-604

Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols

  • Kim-Kwang Raymond ChooAffiliated withLancaster UniversityInformation Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology
  • , Colin BoydAffiliated withLancaster UniversityInformation Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology
  • , Yvonne HitchcockAffiliated withLancaster UniversityInformation Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology

Abstract

We examine various indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols, namely the Bellare & Rogaway (1993, 1995), the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000), and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) proof models. We then consider several variants of these proof models, identify several subtle differences between these variants and models, and compare the relative strengths of the notions of security between the models. For each of the pair of relations between the models (either an implication or a non-implication), we provide proofs or counter-examples to support the observed relations. We also reveal a drawback with the original formulation of the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000) model, whereby the Corrupt query is not allowed.