Abstract
This chapter maps the three concepts named in its title. It argues that there is reason to try to locate informal logic, critical thinking and argumentation studies in relation to one another. In general, such mapping of related concepts shares the feature of normative lexicography that it is quasi-normative, quasi-empirical. The aim is to suggest how the concepts in question ought to be seen to relate to one another, but any normative proposals should also be in touch with actual usage. The chapter first describes argument management as one way of understanding informal logic. There follows an account of the logical heart of argumentation, which identifies another way of understanding informal logic. Then critical thinking is related to those possible mappings of informal logic.
Reprinted, with permission, from Inquiry, Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, Summer, 1996. Vol. XV, No. 4 (pp. 80–93).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
There are different (but related) senses of ‘imply,’ and ‘implication,’ according to which the terms refer to a communicative act—the act of inducing an audience to make an inference. An example, “The advertisement implied that use of the moisturizer would make people appear to be younger than they otherwise were.”
- 2.
By ‘argument’ I have been meaning, and will continue to mean, nothing esoteric or technical. I use the word to refer to such things as one or more sets of reasons considered or offered in support of a proposition; or a verbal exchange in which two or more people trade such reasons, in order to convince one another of a point of view; or a dispute in which two or more people try to refute the viewpoint of others, or to attack their credibility or authority.
- 3.
An argument from a priori analogy is one in which it is concluded that a property should be attributed to something, on the ground that this thing is similar to some other thing to which that property is attributed, in precisely the respect(s) in virtue of which the property is correctly attributed to the other thing. It has the following schema:
-
X is A by virtue of X being/having R (S,T,…).
-
Y is like X in the respect that Y is/has R (S,T,…).
-
Hence, Y is (or should be) A.
To expand the example, “Her essay received an A grade because of the quality of her research and the organization of the essay, and my research and organization are as good as hers, so my essay should get an A grade too.”
-
- 4.
Scriven does not offer a precise definition of probative logic. The following comments may help explain what he has in mind: “ … probative logic focusses on particular types of practical argument—most notably sets of reasons that cannot be sensibly supplemented to make up a classical demonstration … . The patterns which are important to probative inferences are ones often dismissed or crudely misrepresented by formal logics; they are far from the exceptionless exactitude of the universally quantified statement. Indeed, they are often not expressible at all; but one of the clues to the presence of probative inference is the use of terms like ‘typically,’ ‘ideally,’ ‘essentially,’ ‘naturally,’ ‘most’ or ‘mostly’” (Scriven, 1986, pp. 8, 9).
- 5.
Example: “Dental research has found that brushing teeth with toothpaste containing fluoride helps reduce the incidence of tooth decay, so it’s a good idea to use a brand of toothpaste that has a fluoride additive.” See Govier (1992) for a thorough defense of reliance on testimony.
- 6.
Other factors invite confusion as well. There exists an organization called the Association for Informal Logic and critical thinking (AILACT), which suggests something natural and acceptable in their juxtaposition. Each term has its origins in a program of educational reform, with overlapping, albeit different, focuses. Further, in the early years especially, but continuing to the present, many of the important theorists had feet in both camps, and some of these people have tended to use the terms as if they were interchangeable. Finally, since the market for textbooks in these areas is considerable, and since it is in the financial interests of textbook publishers (and their authors) to broaden rather than to narrow the market, there has been a tendency in textbook marketing to blur rather than to distinguish the two concepts. Since many people working in these areas fail to distinguish them, newcomers may be forgiven for identifying the two.
- 7.
To be sure, background knowledge is also crucial for the application of informal logic, since it is required both for the evaluation of premises and also, by virtue of its role as the source of inference-testing counter-examples, for the assessment of inferences.
References
Blair, J. A., & Johnson, R. H. (Eds.). (1980). Informal logic, the first international symposium. Inverness, CA: Edgepress.
Copi, I. M., & Cohen, C. (1990). Introduction to logic (8th ed.). New York: Macmillan.
Davis, S. (Ed.). (1991). Pragmatics, a reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. Reprint, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991.
Eemeren, F. H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech acts in argumentative discussions: A theoretical model for the analysis of discussions directed towards solving conflicts of opinion. Dordrecht: Foris.
Ennis, R. H. (1996). Critical thinking. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Fahnestock, J., & Secor, M. (1982). A rhetoric of argument. New York: Random House.
Fogelin, R. J. (1978). Understanding arguments, an introduction to informal logic. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Govier, T. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris.
Govier, T. (1992). A practical study of argument (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Grice, P. (1989). Logic and conversation. In P. Grice (Ed.), Studies in the way of words, Ch. 2 (pp. 22–40). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in view, principles of reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hoaglund, J. (1984). Critical thinking, an introduction to infromal logic. Newport News, VA: Vale Press.
Jeffrey, R. (1981). Formal logic, its scope and limits (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Johnson, R. H., & Blair, J. A. (1993). Logical self-defense (3rd ed.). Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Johnson, R. H., & Blair, J. A. (1994a). Logical self-defense (United States ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Johnson, R. H., & Blair, J. A. (Eds.). (1994b). New essays in informal logic. Windsor, ON: Informal Logic.
Kahane, H. (1995). Logic and contemporary rhetoric (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Pinto, R. C. (1995). The relation of argument to inference. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Perspectives and approaches, proceedings of the third ISSA conference on argumentation (Vol. I, pp. 271–286). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Ryle, G. (1954). Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salmon, W. C. (1988). Deductivism visited and revisited. In A. Grünbaum & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), The limitations of deductivism (pp. 95–127). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Scriven, M. (1976). Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Scriven, M. (1986). Probative logic: Review and preview. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair, & C. A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation across the lines of discipline (pp. 7–32). Dordrecht: Foris.
Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason. New York: Routledge.
Skyrms, B. (1966). Choice and chance, an introduction to inductive logic (1st ed.). Belmont, CA: Dickenson.
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (1992). Analysing complex argumentation: The reconstruction of multiple and coordinatively compound argumentation in a critical discussion. Amsterdam: SicSat.
Strawson, P. F. (1952). Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen.
Suppe, F. (1988). A non-deductivist approach to theoretical explanation. In A. Grünbaum & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), The limitations of deductivism (pp. 128–166). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Thomas, S. N. (1986). Practical reasoning in natural language (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Weddle, Perry. (1978). Argument, a guide to critical thinking. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Woods, J., & Walton, D. N. (1982). Argument, the logic of the fallacies. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson.
Scriven, M. (1994). The final synthesis. Evaluation Practice. October.
Walton, D. N. (1992a). Plausible argument in everyday conversation. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Blair, J.A. (2012). Argument Management, Informal Logic and Critical Thinking. In: Tindale, C. (eds) Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-2362-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-2363-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)