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Decoding One Out of Many

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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7071))

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Abstract

Generic decoding of linear codes is the best known attack against most code-based cryptosystems. Understanding and measuring the complexity of the best decoding techniques is thus necessary to select secure parameters. We consider here the possibility that an attacker has access to many cryptograms and is satisfied by decrypting (i.e. decoding) only one of them. We show that, for the parameter range corresponding to the McEliece encryption scheme, a variant of Stern’s collision decoding can be adapted to gain a factor almost \(\sqrt{N}\) when N instances are given. If the attacker has access to an unlimited number of instances, we show that the attack complexity is significantly lower, in fact the number of security bits is divided by a number slightly smaller than 3/2 (but larger than 1). Finally we give indications on how to counter those attacks.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt, Project-Team SECRET, France

    Nicolas Sendrier

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  1. Nicolas Sendrier
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

    Bo-Yin Yang

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Sendrier, N. (2011). Decoding One Out of Many. In: Yang, BY. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7071. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25405-5_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25405-5_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25404-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25405-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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