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Towards a Concrete Security Proof of Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier Signature Scheme

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Research in Cryptology (WEWoRC 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4945))

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Abstract

Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier proposed in 2001 a practical code-based signature scheme. We give a rigorous security analysis of a modified version of this scheme in the random oracle model. Our reduction involves two problems of coding theory widely considered as difficult, the Goppa Parametrized Bounded Decoding and the Goppa Code Distinguishing.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. GREYC, UMR 6072, Caen, France

    Léonard Dallot

Authors
  1. Léonard Dallot
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fakultät Medien, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Bauhausstr. 11, 99423, Weimar, Germany

    Stefan Lucks

  2. Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University of Bochum, Germany

    Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

  3. Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany

    Christopher Wolf

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Dallot, L. (2008). Towards a Concrete Security Proof of Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier Signature Scheme. In: Lucks, S., Sadeghi, AR., Wolf, C. (eds) Research in Cryptology. WEWoRC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4945. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88353-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88353-1_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88352-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88353-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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