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International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security

CANS 2007: Cryptology and Network Security pp 265–281Cite as

Anonymity 2.0 – X.509 Extensions Supporting Privacy-Friendly Authentication

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4856))

Abstract

We present a semantic extension to X.509 certificates that allows incorporating new anonymity signature schemes into the X.509 framework. This fact entails advantages to both components. On the one hand, anonymous signature schemes benefit from all the protocols and infrastructure that the X.509 framework provides. On the other hand, the X.509 framework incorporates anonymity as a very interesting new feature. This semantic extension is part of a system that provides user’s controlled anonymous authorization under the X.509 framework. Additionally, the proposal directly fits the much active Identity 2.0 effort, where anonymity is a major supplementary feature that increases the self-control of one’s identity and privacy which is at the center of the activity.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Dept., University of Malaga, Spain

    Vicente Benjumea & Javier Lopez

  2. Computer Science Dept., Columbia University, USA

    Seung Geol Choi

  3. Google & Computer Science Dept., Columbia University, USA

    Moti Yung

Authors
  1. Vicente Benjumea
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  2. Seung Geol Choi
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  3. Javier Lopez
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  4. Moti Yung
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Editor information

Feng Bao San Ling Tatsuaki Okamoto Huaxiong Wang Chaoping Xing

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Benjumea, V., Choi, S.G., Lopez, J., Yung, M. (2007). Anonymity 2.0 – X.509 Extensions Supporting Privacy-Friendly Authentication. In: Bao, F., Ling, S., Okamoto, T., Wang, H., Xing, C. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4856. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76969-9_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76969-9_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76968-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-76969-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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