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Sparse Games Are Hard

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Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 4286))

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Abstract

A two-player game is sparse if most of its payoff entries are zeros. We show that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-hard to approximate in fully polynomial time for sparse games. On the algorithmic side, we give a simple and polynomial-time algorithm for finding exact Nash equilibria in a class of sparse win-lose games.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, X., Deng, X., Teng, SH. (2006). Sparse Games Are Hard. In: Spirakis, P., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68138-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68141-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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