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  • © 2009

Harming Future Persons

Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem

  • Examines what we owe future persons from both moral and legal perspectives
  • Deeply probes particular concerns in areas ranging from the new reproductive technologies to the structure of morality
  • Ranges from the practical (is it wrong to bring an impaired child into existence?) to the theoretical (can “bad” acts be “bad for” no one?)
  • Is written by the most noted scholars and theorists amongst those working today on matters relating to future persons
  • Extends and applies the powerful work Derek Parfit commenced in his brilliant and influential book Reasons and Persons

Part of the book series: International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine (LIME, volume 35)

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Table of contents (16 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XXXVIII
  2. Can Bringing a Person into Existence Harm That Person? Can an Act That Harms No One Be Wrong?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1
  3. If Bringing a Badly Off Person into Existence is Wrong, is Not Bringing aWell Off Person into Existence Also Wrong?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 27-27
  4. Must an Act Worse for People be Worse for a Particular Person?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 69-69
    2. Who Cares About Identity?

      • Nils Holtug
      Pages 71-92
    3. Rule Consequentialism and Non-identity

      • Tim Mulgan
      Pages 115-134
  5. Is the Argument to “No Harm Done” Correct? Must an Act that Harms a Person Make that Person Worse Off?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 135-135
    2. Harming as Causing Harm

      • Elizabeth Harman
      Pages 137-154
    3. Wrongful Life and Procreative Decisions

      • Bonnie Steinbock
      Pages 155-178
    4. Harming and Procreating

      • Matthew Hanser
      Pages 179-199
  6. Is the Morality of Parental Reproductive Choice Special? Can Intentions and Attitudes Make an Act that Harms No One Wrong?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 229-229
    2. Reproduction, Partiality, and the Non-identity Problem

      • Hallvard Lillehammer
      Pages 231-248
    3. Two Varieties of “Better-For” Judgements

      • Peter Herissone-Kelly
      Pages 249-263
    4. Harms to Future People and Procreative Intentions

      • David T. Wasserman
      Pages 265-285
  7. Is the Person Affecting Approach Objectionable Independent of the Nonidentity Problem?

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 287-287

About this book

Melinda A. Roberts and David T. Wasserman 1 Purpose of this Collection What are our obligations with respect to persons who have not yet, and may not ever, come into existence? Few of us believe that we can wrong those whom we leave out of existence altogether—that is, merely possible persons. We may think as well that the directive to be “fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth” 1 does not hold up to close scrutiny. How can it be wrong to decline to bring ever more people into existence? At the same time, we think we are clearly ob- gated to treat future persons—persons who don’t yet but will exist—in accordance with certain stringent standards. Bringing a person into an existence that is truly awful—not worth having—can be wrong, and so can bringing a person into an existence that is worth having when we had the alternative of bringing that same person into an existence that is substantially better. We may think as well that our obligations with respect to future persons are triggered well before the point at which those persons commence their existence. We think it would be wrong, for example, to choose today to turn the Earth of the future into a miserable place even if the victims of that choice do not yet exist.

Reviews

From the reviews:

“This volume is intentionally and wholeheartedly a philosophical book dealing with conceptual analysis (a lot of papers address aspects of ‘harm’), the analysis of ethical judgments, meta-ethical questions (the tension between deontology and consequentialism) and the ontology (or semantics) of future and non-existing persons. … this book is highly recommended for everyone interested in the impact of our actions on future people–not for philosophers only.” (Michael Quante, Medicine Health Care & Philosophy, Issue 4, 2010)

Editors and Affiliations

  • Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, USA

    Melinda A. Roberts

  • The Center for Ethics at Yeshiva University Yeshiva University, Atizapan Estado de México, New York City, USA

    David T. Wasserman

Bibliographic Information

Buy it now

Buying options

eBook USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access