Web and Internet Economics

9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, Proceedings

  • Yiling Chen
  • Nicole Immorlica
Conference proceedings WINE 2013

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8289)

Table of contents (36 papers)

  1. Front Matter
  2. The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz
    Pages 1-14
  3. Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3
    Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani, Adrian Vetta
    Pages 15-23
  4. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
    Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill
    Pages 24-25
  5. Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
    Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnović
    Pages 26-39
  6. Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
    MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
    Pages 40-53
  7. On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
    Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli
    Pages 54-67
  8. Trading Agent Kills Market Information
    Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags
    Pages 68-81
  9. Designing Markets for Daily Deals
    Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner
    Pages 82-95
  10. The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
    José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
    Pages 109-120
  11. Can Credit Increase Revenue?
    Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos
    Pages 121-133
  12. Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
    Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
    Pages 146-159
  13. Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
    Pages 160-173
  14. Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
    Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
    Pages 174-187
  15. Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks
    Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis
    Pages 188-201
  16. Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
    Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis
    Pages 202-215
  17. A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes
    Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Lydia Tlilane
    Pages 216-229
  18. Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
    Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen
    Pages 230-231

About these proceedings

Introduction

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.

Keywords

combinatorial auctions computational complexity game theory scheduling social networks

Editors and affiliations

  • Yiling Chen
    • 1
  • Nicole Immorlica
    • 2
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUSA

Bibliographic information

  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-45045-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-45046-4
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349