Web and Internet Economics

9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, Proceedings

Editors:

ISBN: 978-3-642-45045-7 (Print) 978-3-642-45046-4 (Online)

Table of contents (36 chapters)

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  1. Front Matter

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    Pages 1-14

    The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem

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    Pages 15-23

    Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3

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    Pages 24-25

    The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship

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    Pages 26-39

    Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments

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    Pages 40-53

    Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods

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    Pages 54-67

    On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games

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    Pages 68-81

    Trading Agent Kills Market Information

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    Pages 82-95

    Designing Markets for Daily Deals

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    Pages 96-108

    The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

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    Pages 109-120

    The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited

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    Pages 121-133

    Can Credit Increase Revenue?

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    Pages 134-145

    Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling

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    Pages 146-159

    Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions

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    Pages 160-173

    Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions

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    Pages 174-187

    Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?

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    Pages 188-201

    Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks

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    Pages 202-215

    Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design

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    Pages 216-229

    A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes

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    Pages 230-231

    Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

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    Pages 232-248

    Price of Anarchy for the N-Player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions

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