Internet and Network Economics

8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Liverpool, UK, December 10-12, 2012. Proceedings

  • Paul W. Goldberg
Conference proceedings WINE 2012

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7695)

Table of contents (49 papers)

  1. Front Matter
  2. Regular Papers

    1. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social Networks
      Vasileios Tzoumas, Christos Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis
      Pages 1-14
    2. Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games
      Yoram Bachrach, Ian Kash, Nisarg Shah
      Pages 15-29
    3. An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported Services
      Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas
      Pages 30-43
    4. Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
      Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
      Pages 44-57
    5. Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games
      Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti
      Pages 72-85
    6. Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover Effects
      Nikolay Archak, Vahab Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan
      Pages 86-99
    7. Choosing Products in Social Networks
      Sunil Simon, Krzysztof R. Apt
      Pages 100-113
    8. Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference
      Morteza Zadimoghaddam, Aaron Roth
      Pages 114-127
    9. Funding Games: The Truth but Not the Whole Truth
      Amotz Bar-Noy, Yi Gai, Matthew P. Johnson, Bhaskar Krishnamachari, George Rabanca
      Pages 128-141
    10. Greedy Selfish Network Creation
      Pascal Lenzner
      Pages 142-155
    11. Group Activity Selection Problem
      Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer, Gerhard Woeginger
      Pages 156-169
    12. Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting
      Avishay Maya, Noam Nisan
      Pages 170-183
    13. LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy
      Georgios Piliouras, Tomáš Valla, László A. Végh
      Pages 184-197
    14. Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse Seller
      Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna
      Pages 198-211
    15. Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing
      Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, James Zou
      Pages 212-226
    16. Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems
      Bundit Laekhanukit, Guyslain Naves, Adrian Vetta
      Pages 227-243
    17. On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
      Nicole Immorlica, Emmanouil Pountourakis
      Pages 244-255
    18. On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality
      Dvir Falik, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
      Pages 256-269

About these proceedings

Introduction

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012, held in Liverpool, UK, in December 2012. The 36 revised full papers and 13 revised short papers presented together with the abstracts of 3 papers about work in progress and 3 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 112 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algorithmic game theory; algorithmic mechanism design; auction algorithms and analysis; computational advertising; computational aspects of equilibria; computational social choice; convergence and learning in games; coalitions, coordination and collective action; economics aspects of security and privacy; economics aspects of distributed and network computing; information and attention economics; network games; price differentiation and price dynamics; social networks.

Keywords

approximation algorithm game theory network topology privacy auction strategic agents

Editors and affiliations

  • Paul W. Goldberg
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of LiverpoolLiverpoolUK

Bibliographic information

  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-35310-9
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-35311-6
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349