Algorithmic Game Theory

5th International Symposium, SAGT 2012, Barcelona, Spain, October 22-23, 2012. Proceedings

  • Maria Serna
Conference proceedings

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7615)

Table of contents (22 papers)

  1. Front Matter
  2. A Classification of Weakly Acyclic Games
    Krzysztof R. Apt, Sunil Simon
    Pages 1-12
  3. Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
    Krzysztof R. Apt, Guido Schäfer
    Pages 13-24
  4. Mechanisms for Scheduling with Single-Bit Private Values
    Vincenzo Auletta, George Christodoulou, Paolo Penna
    Pages 25-36
  5. The Complexity of Decision Problems about Nash Equilibria in Win-Lose Games
    Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas
    Pages 37-48
  6. An Optimal Bound to Access the Core in TU-Games
    Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
    Pages 49-60
  7. Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games
    K. Ruben Brokkelkamp, Mees J. de Vries
    Pages 61-71
  8. Basic Network Creation Games with Communication Interests
    Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Martina Hüllmann, Peter Kling, Alexander Setzer
    Pages 72-83
  9. Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria
    Nuh Aygun Dalkiran, Moshe Hoffman, Ramamohan Paturi, Daniel Ricketts, Andrea Vattani
    Pages 84-95
  10. Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria Below Two-Thirds
    John Fearnley, Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    Pages 108-119
  11. Capacitated Network Design Games
    Michal Feldman, Tom Ron
    Pages 132-143
  12. Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games
    Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
    Pages 144-155
  13. On the Hardness of Network Design for Bottleneck Routing Games
    Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis
    Pages 156-167
  14. Ad Auctions with Data
    Hu Fu, Patrick Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii
    Pages 168-179
  15. Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios
    Paul W. Goldberg, Antony McCabe
    Pages 180-191
  16. On the Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria
    Paul W. Goldberg, Arnoud Pastink
    Pages 192-203
  17. Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources
    Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Stefano Moretti, Nguyen Kim Thang
    Pages 204-215
  18. Network Bargaining: Using Approximate Blocking Sets to Stabilize Unstable Instances
    Jochen Könemann, Kate Larson, David Steiner
    Pages 216-226

About these proceedings


This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2012, held in Barcelona, Spain, in October 2012. The 22 revised full papers presented together with 2 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. The papers present original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory and address various current topics such as solution concepts in game theory; efficiency of equilibria and price of anarchy; complexity classes in game theory; computational aspects of equilibria; computational aspects of fixed-point theorems; repeated games; evolution and learning in games; convergence of dynamics; coalitions, coordination and collective action; reputation, recommendation and trust systems; graph-theoretic aspects of social networks; network games; cost-sharing algorithms and analysis; computing with incentives; algorithmic mechanism design; computational social choice; decision theory, and pricing; auction algorithms and analysis; economic aspects of distributed computing; internet economics and computational advertising.


adwords economic theory network design potential function pure nash equilibrium

Editors and affiliations

  • Maria Serna
    • 1
  1. 1.Department de Llenguatges i Sistemes InformàticsUniversitat Politècnica de Catalunya, ALBCOMBarcelona,Spain

Bibliographic information

  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-33995-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-33996-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349