Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications

Second International ICST Conference, AMMA 2011, NewYork, NY, USA, August 22-23, 2011, Revised Selected Papers

ISBN: 978-3-642-30912-0 (Print) 978-3-642-30913-7 (Online)

Table of contents (22 chapters)

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  1. Front Matter

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  2. Market Design and Interfaces

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      Pages 1-1

      Strategyproofness for “Price Takers” as a Desideratum for Market Design

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      Pages 2-4

      Market User Interface Design

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      Pages 5-17

      Evaluating Hidden Market Design

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      Pages 18-18

      Expectations: Point-Estimates, Probability Distributions, Confidence, and Forecasts

  3. Internet and Information Markets

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      Pages 19-30

      Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions

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      Pages 31-32

      Instructor Rating Markets

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      Pages 33-33

      An Experimental Study of Sponsored-Search Auctions

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      Pages 34-35

      Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational

  4. Combinatorial Mechanisms

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      Pages 36-37

      Hierarchical Package Bidding: Computational Complexity and Bidder Behavior

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      Pages 38-39

      Efficiency, Auctioneer Revenue, and Bidding Behavior in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

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      Pages 40-52

      A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data

  5. Auction Theory

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      Pages 53-53

      Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions

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      Pages 54-54

      Approximation of Large Games with Applications to Uniform Price Auctions

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      Pages 55-55

      Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case

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      Pages 56-56

      Improving Allocations through Revenue Redistribution in Auctions with Entry

  6. Matching and Double Auctions

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      Pages 57-57

      Bubbles, Crashes and Efficiency with Double Auction Mechanisms

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      Pages 58-59

      From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms

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      Pages 60-61

      Stability and Efficiency in the General-Priority-Based Assignment

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      Pages 62-75

      The Regulated Market for Kidneys in Iran

  7. Novel Applications

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      Pages 76-87

      Solids - A Combinatorial Auction for a Housing Corporation

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