Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison

Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities?

Editors:

ISBN: 978-1-4020-6274-2 (Print) 978-1-4020-6279-7 (Online)

Table of contents (25 chapters)

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  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x

  2. Incommensurability, As Differences in Quasi-Intuitive Cognitive Capacities: A Task for Psychology?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 1-17

      Introduction

    2. Book Chapter

      Pages 21-39

      Incommensurability Naturalized

    3. No Access

      Book Chapter

      Pages 41-46

      Commentary on Bird’s Paper

  3. Incommensurability in a Wittgensteinian Perspective: How to Make Sense of Nonsense

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 49-70

      Nonsense and Paradigm Change

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 71-83

      Commentary on “Nonsense and Paradigm Change”, by Aristides Baltas

  4. Intra-Theoretical Change, as a Subjective Creative Elucidation of an Objective Formerly Present Content

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 87-101

      From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 103-105

      Commentary on “From One Version to the Other: Intra-Theoretical Change”, by Anouk Barberousse

  5. Investigating the Continuities of Scientific Theorizing: A Task for the Bayesian?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 109-129

      Modeling High-Temperature Superconductivity: Correspondence at Bay?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 131-141

      An Instrumental Bayesianism Meets the History of Science

  6. From the Cumulativity of Physical Predictions to the Cumulativity of Physics

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 145-151

      Is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 153-156

      Commentary on “is Science Cumulative? a Physicist Viewpoint”, by Bernard d’Espagnat

  7. From Denotational Continuity to Entity Realism

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 159-202

      The Optimistic Meta-Induction and Ontological Continuity: the Case of the Electron

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 203-206

      Some Optimism for the Pessimist

  8. Is a Realist Interpretation of Quantum Physics Possible?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 209-217

      Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 219-222

      Commentary on “Can We Consider Quantum Mechanics to Be a Description of Reality?”, by Herve Zwirn

  9. Ontological Continuity: A Policy for Model Building or an Argument in Favour of Scientific Realism?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 225-238

      Reasons for Choosing Among Readings of Equipollent Theories

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 239-243

      Harré Needs No Realism

  10. A Change of Perspective: Dissolving the Incommensurability Problem in the Framework of a Theoretical Pluralism Incorporating an Instrumental Rationality

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 247-264

      Of Course Idealizations Are Incommensurable!

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 265-269

      Incommensurability from a Modelling Perspective

  11. What Can Philosophical Theories of Scientific Method Do?

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      Book Chapter

      Pages 273-290

      The Aim And Structure Of Methodological Theory

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