Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87

Proceedings

  • Carl Pomerance
Conference proceedings CRYPTO 1987

DOI: 10.1007/3-540-48184-2

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 293)

Table of contents (43 papers)

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-X
  2. Communication Networks and Standards

  3. Protocols

    1. Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract)
      Yvo Desmedt, Claude Goutier, Samy Bengio
      Pages 21-39
    2. Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations (Extended Abstract)
      Russell Impagliazzo, Moti Yung
      Pages 40-51
    3. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
      Alfredo De Santis, Silvio Micali, Giuseppe Persiano
      Pages 52-72
    4. Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party’s Input and Correctness of the Result
      David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 87-119
    5. A Simple and Secure Way to Show the Validity of Your Public Key
      Jeroen van de Graaf, Renė Peralta
      Pages 128-134
    6. Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret (Extended Abstract)
      Ernest F. Brickell, David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 156-166
    7. Strong Practical Protocols
      Judy H. Moore
      Pages 167-172
  4. Key Distribution Systems

  5. Public Key Systems

    1. An Impersonation-Proof Identity Verification Scheme
      Gustavus J. Simmons
      Pages 211-215
    2. Arbitration in Tamper Proof Systems
      George I. Davida, Brian J. Matt
      Pages 216-222
    3. Efficient Digital Public-Key Signatures with Shadow
      Louis Guillou, Jean-Jacques Quisquater
      Pages 223-223

About these proceedings

Introduction

Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.

Keywords

authentication cryptoanalysis cryptography cryptology cryptosystems data security digital signature encryption privacy security

Editors and affiliations

  • Carl Pomerance
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsThe University of GeorgiaAthensUSA

Bibliographic information

  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-18796-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-48184-3
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349