Internet and Network Economics

Second International Workshop, WINE 2006, Patras, Greece, December 15-17, 2006. Proceedings

Editors:

ISBN: 978-3-540-68138-0 (Print) 978-3-540-68141-0 (Online)
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Table of contents (35 chapters)

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  1. Front Matter

    Pages -

  2. Book Chapter

    Pages 1-2

    Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract)

  3. Book Chapter

    Pages 3-15

    Dynamic Mechanism Design

  4. Book Chapter

    Pages 16-26

    Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints

  5. Book Chapter

    Pages 27-36

    Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit

  6. Book Chapter

    Pages 37-49

    Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain

  7. Book Chapter

    Pages 50-61

    Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games

  8. Book Chapter

    Pages 62-73

    On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games

  9. Book Chapter

    Pages 74-86

    Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games

  10. Book Chapter

    Pages 87-98

    The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games

  11. Book Chapter

    Pages 99-111

    First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction

  12. Book Chapter

    Pages 112-123

    Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems

  13. Book Chapter

    Pages 124-135

    Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice

  14. Book Chapter

    Pages 136-148

    Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design

  15. Book Chapter

    Pages 149-149

    Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves

  16. Book Chapter

    Pages 150-161

    Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures

  17. Book Chapter

    Pages 162-173

    Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case

  18. Book Chapter

    Pages 174-185

    Selfish Service Installation in Networks

  19. Book Chapter

    Pages 186-197

    Games of Connectivity

  20. Book Chapter

    Pages 198-213

    Assignment Problems in Rental Markets

  21. Book Chapter

    Pages 214-224

    On Portfolio’s Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas

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