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  • © 2013

Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

Authors:

  • Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances
  • Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods
  • Includes comprehensive surveys on the related subjects
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 668)

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Table of contents (9 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xv
  2. Introduction

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 1-2
  3. Selected Topics in Revenue Management

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 3-30
  4. Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 43-72
  5. Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 73-82
  6. Conclusions and Future Research

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 159-161
  7. Back Matter

    Pages 163-168

About this book

​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Reviews

From the book reviews:

“The book has nine chapters. … the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. … it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case … .” (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September–October, 2014)

Authors and Affiliations

  • Düsseldorf, Germany

    Demet Çetiner

About the author

Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.

Bibliographic Information

Buy it now

Buying options

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access