Skip to main content
Log in

Balanced increment and concession methods for negotiation support

Métodos de incrementos y concesiones equilibradas para el apoyo de negociaciones

  • Published:
RACSAM - Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y Naturales. Serie A. Matematicas Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We reconsIDer bargaining models developed to determine fair and reasonable solution outcomes for bargaining problems. Based on these models we develop novel negotiation support methods that will be able to produce on demand recommendations during a negotiation process. We first briefly discuss Raiffa's solution of balanced increments and, based on that IDea, propose another solution based on balanced concessions. The combined application of the bargaining process models associated with these solutions leads to a flexible negotiation support method. A risk sharing negotiation problem illustrates how to implement our negotiation support method in a negotiation case.

Resumen

En este artículo reconsIDeramos algunos modelos de regateo originalmente desarrollados para la obtención de soluciones equitativas y razonables a problemas de negociación. Basándonos en dichos modelos, se proponen nuevos métodos de apoyo a la negociación capaces de producir recomendaciones en cualquier momento de un proceso de negociación. En primer lugar, discutimos brevemente la solución de incrementos equilibrados propuesta por Raiffa. A partir de dicha IDea, proponemos otra solución basada en concesiones equilibradas. La aplicación combinada de los modelos de los procesos de negociación asociados con estas soluciones nos permite proponer un nuevo método de apoyo a la negociación. Un problema sobre cómo distribuir recursos para afrontar riesgos compartIDos entre dos países ilustra cómo aplicar nuestro método de apoyo a la negociación.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Bronisz, P. and Krus, L., (1989). Dynamic solution of two-person bargaining games. In F. Mautner-Markhof (ed.), Processes of International Negotiations, Westview Press, Boulder, USA.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Fisher, R., (1978). International Mediation: A Working GuIDe. International Peace Academy, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Hämäläinen, R. P., (2003). Decisionarium: aIDing decisions, negotiating and collecting opinions on the web, J. of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 12, 2–3, 101–110. DOI: 10.1002/mcda.350

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Harsanyi, J. C., (1956). Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: A critical discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's theories, Econometrica, 24, 2, 144–157. DOI: 10.2307/1905748

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Livne, Z. A., (1989). Axiomatic characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions to the bargaining problem, Oper. Res., 37, 6, 972–980. DOI: 10.1287/opre.37.6.972

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Nash, J. F., (1950). The bargaining problem, Econometrica, 18, 2, 155–162. DOI: 10.2307/1907266

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Nash, J. F., (1951). Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics, 54, 2, 286–295. DOI: 10.2307/1969529

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  8. Nash, J. F., (1953). Two person cooperative games, Econometrica, 21, 1, 128–140. DOI: 10.2307/1906951

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Peters, H., (1987). Characterizations of bargaining solutions by properties of their status quo sets, Methods of Operations Research, 57, 493–494.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Peters, H. and Van Damme, E., (1991). Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms, Math. Oper. Res., 16, 3, 447–461. DOI: 10.1287/moor.16.3.447

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  11. Raiffa, H., (1953). Arbitration schemes for generalized two-person games, Ann. of Math. Stud., 28, 361–387.

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Raiffa, H. Richardson, J. and Metcalfe, D., (2002). Negotiation Analysis: the Science and Art of Collaborative Decision Making. Harvard University Press, CambrIDge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Rios Insua, D., Holgado, J. and Moreno, R., (2004). An e-negotiation system to support edemocracy, J. of Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 12, 213–218.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Rios, J. and Rios Insua, D., (2008). A framework for participatory budget elaboration support, J. of the Operational Research Society, 59, 2, 203–212. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2602501

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Rios, J. and D. Rios Insua, (2009). Supporting negotiations over influence diagrams, Decision Analysis, 6, 3, 153–171. DOI: 10.1287/deca.1090.0152

    Article  Google Scholar 

  16. Thomson, W., (1994). Cooperative models of bargaining. In R. J. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.), Handbook of Game Theory, North-Holland, Vol. II, Chapter 35, 1238–1277. DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(05)80067-0

  17. Zeuthen, F., (1930). Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare, G. Routledge & Sons, London.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Submitted by Francisco Javier Girón González Torre

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Rios, J., Rios Insua, D. Balanced increment and concession methods for negotiation support. Rev. R. Acad. Cien. Serie A. Mat. 104, 41–56 (2010). https://doi.org/10.5052/RACSAM.2010.05

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.5052/RACSAM.2010.05

Keywords

Mathematics Subject Classifications

Navigation