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Optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms in active systems

  • Large Scale Systems Control
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Abstract

We consider mechanisms in two-level active systems, where additional conditions of incentive compatibility are imposed on planning procedures and incentive schemes to coordinate preferences of agents and a principal. These conditions ensure plan fulfillment and truth-telling (strategy-proofness). Finally, sufficient conditions of optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms are established.

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Original Russian Text © A.K. Enaleev, 2011, published in Upravlenie Bol’shimi Sistemami, 2011, No. 33, pp. 143–166.

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Enaleev, A.K. Optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms in active systems. Autom Remote Control 74, 491–505 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117913030120

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117913030120

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