Dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating differential games

  • L. A. Petrosyan
  • D. W. K. Yeung
Article

DOI: 10.1134/S0081543806050154

Cite this article as:
Petrosyan, L.A. & Yeung, D.W.K. Proc. Steklov Inst. Math. (2006) 253(Suppl 1): S208. doi:10.1134/S0081543806050154

Abstract

The paradigm of randomly furcating differential games incorporates stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random events are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where future environments are not known with certainty.

Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • L. A. Petrosyan
    • 1
  • D. W. K. Yeung
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.St. Petersburg State UniversityPetrodvorets, St. PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.Center of Game TheoryHong Kong Baptist UniversityKowloon, Hong KongChina