Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Understanding Academic Journal Market Failure: The Case of Austrian Economics

  • Article
  • Published:
Eastern Economic Journal Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Heterodox schools of economic thought often claim that discrimination takes place in the market for academic articles. Biases exist that prevent heterodox ideas from appearing in mainstream journals. We assess the claim in the context of Austrian economics. First, we document that the research topics pursued in Austrian journals differ significantly from mainstream journals. Austrians pursue different questions. Second, we argue that Austrian articles do not suffer from discrimination based on lack of formalism or ideology. Rather, the lack of Austrian articles in mainstream journals results from the lack of testable hypotheses in their arguments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Of course, the theory of the second-best had been developed and gained traction, which forced Chicago economists to reconsider and refine their arguments for perfect competition. Nevertheless, the perfectly competitive model remained the benchmark for welfare comparisons.

  2. The work of Cowen and Fink [1985], White [1984], Selgin and White [1994], Kirzner [1997], and Caldwell [1997] stand out as exceptions to this claim.

  3. We should note that the size of the Solow Residual, which attributes most of economic growth to “technology,” served as an impetus for the new research. New growth theory and recent mainstream development literature tried to understand the black box of technology by turning to cultural and institutional explanations [Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Romer 1996].

  4. Krugman [2009, p. 561] writes  In 1980, this similar-similar trade was still a relatively new phenomenon. Trade in the first great age of globalization — the age made possible by steam engines and telegraphs — was mainly dissimilar-dissimilar: trade in dissimilar goods between dissimilar countries. Comparative advantage, which one may define as the idea that countries trade to take advantage of their differences, clearly explained most of what was going on. It was only with the recovery of trade after World War II, and especially after the major trade agreements of the 1950s and 1960s, that the more puzzling trade patterns that fed the counterculture became prominent.

  5. It should be noted that the number of articles devoted to economic history increased in the last couple of issues. The rise in applied Austrian economics coincides with Peter Boettke's editorship of the Review of Austrian Economics in 1997 and his commitment to an “analytic narrative” research program. Prior editors were Walter Block, Hans-Herman Hoppe, Murray Rothbard, and Joseph Salerno.

  6. A notable exception has been the disputes between macroeconomists regarding calibration. See Prescott [1986] and Summers [1986] for an illuminating exchange.

  7. Boettke [1995 [2001], p. 13] provides a nice critique of Hoppe's argument by pointing out that Hoppe and Murrary Rothbard, if correct, have successfully derived an “ought” from an “is” proposition!

  8. For example, Hayek did not support free banking. See White [1999].

  9. We thank Andrew Young for drawing our attention to this literature.

  10. O’Driscoll and Rizzo [1985, Ch. 4] offered a critique of dynamic optimization models that could be extended to new growth models and better inform the limitations of the model, but no one has built off of this foundation for engaging the mainstream.

  11. We should note that Engerman and Sokoloff's research has exerted a large impact on the recent literature on economic development, despite the absence of any econometric analysis.

  12. See Foss [2000] for reasons why Austrians should incorporate aspects of game theory into their theoretical toolbox.

  13. See Buchanan and Yoon [2002] for a fascinating discussion of the differing implications of the various trade models.

  14. Haberler [1990] responded to Krugman as well.

  15. According to Google Scholar, Hart and Moore [1990] has over 3,000 citations and Grossman and Hart [1986] has nearly 5,000 citations.

  16. The few cases where Austrians do use econometric results include Keeler [2001], Boettke and Subrick [2002], and Montgomery [2006].

  17. We do not mean to suggest that, in 2011, it would be impossible for an article without econometrics or formal theory to appear in the top economic journals. Rather, our point is that prior to the 1980s, an article without econometrics and formal theory was far more likely to appear in the top journals because there was a greater interest in conceptual papers that had widespread applicability.

  18. Olson did subsequently formalize the argument in McGuire and Olson [1997].

  19. Anderson and Hill [1975, 1983, 1991] published earlier versions of their theory in the Southern Economic Journal and the Journal of Law and Economics.

  20. Vernon Smith has also examined Hayek's ideas in the context of experimental economics. See Smith [1982, 2003] for discussions.

References

  • Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson . 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369–1401.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson . 2002. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the World Income Distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4): 1231–1294.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., and T. Verdier . 2000. The Choice between Market Failure and Corruption. American Economic Review, 90 (1): 194–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alchian, A. 1950. Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 58 (3): 211–221.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, T., and P.J. Hill . 1975. The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West. Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1): 163–179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, T., and P.J. Hill . 1983. Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement? Southern Economic Journal, 50 (2): 438–450.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, T., and P.J. Hill . 1990. The Race for Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (1): 177–197.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, T., and P.J. Hill . 2004. The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier. Stanford, CA: Stanford Economics and Finance.

    Google Scholar 

  • Antweiler, W., and D. Trefler . 2002. Increasing Returns and All That: A View from Trade. American Economic Review, 92 (1): 93–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baetjer, H. 2000. Capital as Embodied Knowledge: Some Implications for the Theory of Economic Growth. Review of Austrian Economics, 13 (2): 147–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, G., and T. Hubbard . 2001. Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm. American Economic Review, 91 (2): 189–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Banerjee, A. 1997. A Theory of Misgovernance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4): 1289–1332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Basu, K. 2000. Prelude to Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bates, R., A. Greif, M. Levi, J-L. Rosenthal, and B. Weingast . 1998. Analytic Narratives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benson, B. 1999. An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State. Review of Austrian Economics, 12 (2): 131–160.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bhagwati, J. 1989. Is Free Trade Passe After All? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 125 (1): 17–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P. 1993. Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Transformation. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P. 1994. The Collapse of Development Planning. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P. 2001[1995]. Why Are There No Austrian Socialists, in Calculation and Coordination, edited by P. Boettke. New York: Routledge.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P. 2001. Calculation and Coordination. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P. 2002. The Use and Abuse of the History of Economic Thought within the Austrian School of Economics. Annual Supplement to History of Political Economy, 34 (1): 337–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P., and E. Lopez . 2002. Austrian Economics and Public Choice. Review of Austrian Economics, 15 (2/3): 111–119.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boettke, P., and J.R. Subrick . 2002. Rule of Law, Development, and Human Capabilities. Supreme Court Economic Review, 10 (1): 109–126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, G., and J. Buchanan . 2003[1980]. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. 1964. What Should Economists Do? Southern Economic Journal, 30 (3): 213–222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J., and Y. Yoon . 2002. Globalization as Framed by the Two Logics of Trade. Independent Review, 6 (3): 399–405.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caballero, R., and M. Hammour . 1994. The Cleansing Effects of Recessions. American Economic Review, 84 (4): 1350–1368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caldwell, B. 1997. Hayek and Socialism. Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (4): 1856–1890.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (13): 386–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3 (1): 1–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cowen, T. 1997. Risks and Business Cycles: New and Old Austrian Approaches. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowen, T., and R. Fink . 1985. Inconsistent Equilibrium Constructs: The Evenly Rotating Economy in Mises and Rothbard. American Economic Review, 75 (4): 866–869.

    Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 57 (2): 347–359.

    Google Scholar 

  • Djankov, S., E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer 2003. The New Comparative Economics. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31 (4): 595–619.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Easterly, W. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engerman, S., and K. Sokolof . 2000. Institutions, Factor Endowments, and the Paths of Development in the New World. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (3): 217–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evenett, S.J., and W. Keller . 2002. On Theories Explaining the Success of the Gravity Equation. Journal of Political Economy, 110 (2): 281–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher, F. 1983. Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz . 1963. A Monetary History of the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foss, N. 2000. Austrian Economics and Game Theory: A Stocktaking and an Evaluation. Review of Austrian Economics, 13 (1): 41–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foss, K., and N. Foss . 2002. Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization. Review of Austrian Economics, 15 (4): 297–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garrison, R. 2001. Time and Money. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glaeser, E., and A. Shleifer . 2002. Legal Origins. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4): 1193–1229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif, A. 1989. Reputations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders. Journal of Economic History, 49 (4): 857–882.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greif, A. 1993. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition. American Economic Review, 83 (3): 525–548.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, G., and E. Helpman . 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, H. 2000. The State: Agent or Proprietor? Economics of Governance, 1 (1): 3–11.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, H., and S.J. Noh . 1994. Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare. Journal of Public Economics, 53 (2): 187–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grossman, S., and O. Hart . 1986. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4): 691–179.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haberler, G. 1950. Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade. Economic Journal, 60 (238): 223–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haberler, G. 1990. Strategic Trade Theory and the New International Economics. The Political Economy of International Trade, edited by Ronald Findaly and Anne Krueger. New York: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, R., and C. Jones . 1999. Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1): 83–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, O., and J. Moore . 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6): 1119–1158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, D. 1998. The Faults of Formalism and the Magic of Markets. Critical Review, 12 (1–2): 127–138.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helpman, E. 2004. The Mystery of Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holcombe, R. 1994. The Economic Foundations of Government. New York: New York University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Holcombe, R. 1998. Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1 (2): 45–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holcombe, R. 2004. The National Research Council Rankings of Research Universities: Its Research on Impact in Economics. Econ Journal Watch 1 (3): 498–514.

  • Hoppe, H.H. 1993. The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Horwitz, S. 2000. Microfoundations and Macroeconomics: An Austrian Perspective. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hummels, D., and J. Levinsohn . 1995. Monopolistic Competition and International Trade: Reconsidering the Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3): 799–836.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keeler, J. 2001. Empirical Evidence on the Austrian Business Cycle Theory. Review of Austrian Economics, 14 (4): 331–351.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, I. 1992. The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian Economics. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kirzner, I. . 1997. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach. Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1): 60–85..

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, D., and C. Stern . 2004–2005. How Politically Diverse Are the Social Sciences and Humanities? Survey Evidence from Six Fields. Academic Questions, Winter 2004–05, 18 (1): 40–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, D. 2005. The PhD Circle in Academic Economics. Econ Journal Watch, 2 (1): 133–148.

  • Klein, P. 1997. Economic Calculation and the Limits of Organization. Review of Austrian Economics, 9 (1): 3–28.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knack, S., and P. Keefer . 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-country Test Using Alternative Institutional Mechanisms. Economics and Politics, 7 (3): 207–228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, A 1990. Government Failures in Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (3): 9–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krugman, P 1987. Is Free Trade Passe? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (2): 131–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krugman, P 2009. The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography. The American Economic Review, 99 (3): 561–571.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kydland, F., and E. Prescott . 1982. Time To Build and Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica, 50 (6): 1345–1370.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny . 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113–1155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny 1999. The Quality of Government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (1): 222–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lavoie, D. 1985a. National Economic Planning: What Is Left? Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lavoie, D. 1985b. Rivalry and Central Planning. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leijonhufvud, A. 2002. Review of Steven Howrwitz's Microfoundations and Macroeconomics. Review of Austrian Economics, 15 (4): 364–368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, P., and S. Phelan . 2000. An Austrian Theory of the Firm. Review of Austrian Economics, 13 (1): 59–79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levy, D. 1990. The Bias in Centrally Planned Economies. Public Choice, 67 (3): 213–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lucas, R 1981. Understanding Business Cycles, in Studies in Business-cycle Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lucas, R. 1988. On the Mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (1): 3–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahoney, P. 2000. Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right. Journal of Legal Studies, 30 (2): 503–525.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masten, S. 2002. Modern Evidence on the Firm. American Economic Review, 92 (2): 428–432.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey, D. 2000[1995]. Kelly Green Golf Shoes and the Intellectual Range from M to N, in How to Be Human Though an Economist, edited by D. McCloskey. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • McGuire, M., and M. Olson . 1997. The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force. Journal of Economic Literature, 34: 72–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • McMillan, J. 2002. Re-inventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Montgomery, M. 2006. Austrian Persistence? Time to Build Survey Evidence on the Time Structure of Investment Spending. Review of Austrian Economics, 19 (1): 17–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • North, D. 1984. Government and the Cost of Exchange in History. Journal of Economic History, 44 (2): 255–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • North, D., and B. Weingast . 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-century England. Journal of Economic History, 49 (4): 803–832.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Driscoll, G., and M. Rizzo . 1985. The Economics of Time and Ignorance. London and New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson, M. 1993. Democracy, Dictatorship, and Development. American Political Science Review, 87 (3): 567–576.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prescott, E. 1986. Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 10 (4): 9–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rizzo, M. 1980. Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability. Journal of Legal Studies, 9 (2): 291–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian, and F. Trebbi . 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2): 131–165.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Romer, P. 1986. Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (5): 1002–1037.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Romer, P. 1996. Why, Indeed in America? Theory, History and the Origins of Modern Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: NBER, (January, 1996).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, S. 1997. Austrian and Neoclassical Economics: Any There Gains from Trade? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (4): 139–152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, N., and L. Birdzell . 1986. How the West Grew Rich. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saari, D. 1995. The Mathematical Complexity of Simple Economics. Notices of the American Mathematical Society, 42 (2): 222–230.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sachs, J. 2001. Tropical Underdevelopment, NBER Working Paper #8119, February 2001.

  • Sautet, Frederick 2000. An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Selgin, G., and L. White . 1994. How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money? Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (4): 1718–1749.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny . 1998. The Grabbing Hand. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. 1982. Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental Examination of the ‘Hayek Hypothesis’. Economic Inquiry, 20 (2): 165–189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. 2003. Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics. American Economic Review, 93 (3): 465–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. 1994. Whither Socialism? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, J. 2002. Information and Change in the Paradigm in Economics. American Economic Review, 92 (3): 460–501.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Summers, L. 1986. Some Skeptical Observations on Real Business Cycle Theory. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 10 (4): 23–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomsen, E. 1992. Prices and Knowledge: A Market Process Perspective. New York: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wagner, R. 1999. Austrian Cycle Theory: Saving the Wheat while Discarding the Chaff. Review of Austrian Economics, 12 (1): 65–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whinston, M. 2001. Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-cost Theories of Firm Scope. American Economic Review, 91 (2): 184–188.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • White, L. 1984. Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience, and Debate, 1800–1845. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • White, L. 1999. Why Hayek Didn’t Favor Laissez-Faire in Banking? History of Political Economy, 31 (4): 753–769.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, NY: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Witt, U. 2009. Do Entrepreneurs Need Firms? A Contribution to a Missing Chapter in Austrian Economics Review of Austrian Economics, 9 (1): 99–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • World Bank. 1996. World Development Report: From Plan to Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Yates, A. 2000. The Knowledge Problem, Entrepreneurial Discovery, and Austrian Market Process. Journal of Economic Theory, 91 (1): 59–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yeager, L. 1997. Austrian Economics, Neoclassicism, and the Market Test. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (4): 153–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Young, A. 2005. Reallocating Labor to Initiate Changes in Capital Structures: Hayek Revisited. Economic Letters, 89 (3): 275–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank Peter Boettke, Bryan Caplan, Christopher Coyne, Eric Crampton, Andrew Farrant, Peter Leeson, James Marchand, Skip Mounts, David Prychitko, Gilbert Skillman, and Andrew Young for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. All remaining errors are ours.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Manuel H. Johnson Center for Political Economy, Sorrell College of Business, Troy University, 137 Bibb Graves Hall, Troy, 36082, AL, USA

    Scott A Beaulier

  2. Department of Economics, James Madison University, 800 S. Main Street MSC 0204, Harrisonburg, 22807, VA, USA

    J Robert Subrick

Authors
  1. Scott A Beaulier
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. J Robert Subrick
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Beaulier, S., Subrick, J. Understanding Academic Journal Market Failure: The Case of Austrian Economics. Eastern Econ J 39, 444–463 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2012.32

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2012.32

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Search

Navigation