Journal of Banking Regulation

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 201–235

The regulatory ‘Big-Bang’ on the internal corporate governance of Greek banks and its implications

Paper

DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jbr.2350052

Cite this article as:
Staikouras, P. J Bank Regul (2007) 8: 201. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jbr.2350052
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Abstract

Banks are special financial institutions not only generating unique regulatory challenges but also raising particular corporate governance concerns. While acknowledging the disciplinary power of the takeover market, the paper asserts that the market for corporate control is not a perfect substitute for — but rather a supplement to — corporate governance regulation. The paper provides a critical analysis of the new legal framework concerning internal corporate governance of Greek banks under the Decision 2577/2006 of the Governor of the Bank of Greece and makes proposals towards improvement and reform. The paper concludes inter alia that the new regulatory framework does not always seem to sit comfortably within the corporate governance regime already in force under the 2002 Corporate Governance Act; hence, remedial action should be taken to ameliorate the inconsistencies that have been detected, safeguard legal certainty and enhance the efficiency of the novel corporate governance regime for banks.

Keywords

corporate governancebankstakeoverGreeceBoG Decision 2577/2006regulation

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Banking and Financial Management, University of PiraeusPiraeusGreece