Eastern Economic Journal

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 325–346

Gender Preference and Equilibrium in the Imperfectly Competitive Market for Physician Services

Authors

  • Jessica Wolpaw Reyes
    • Department of Economics, Amherst College
    • National Bureau of Economic Research
Article

DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.eej.9050033

Cite this article as:
Reyes, J. Eastern Econ J (2008) 34: 325. doi:10.1057/palgrave.eej.9050033

Abstract

I analyze how the imperfectly competitive market for obstetricians and gynecologists (ob-gyns) clears in the face of an excess demand for female ob-gyns. This excess demand arises because all ob-gyn patients are women, many women prefer a female ob-gyn, and only a small portion of ob-gyns are female. I find that both money and non-money prices adjust: female ob-gyns charge higher fees and also have longer waiting times. Furthermore, institutional structure matters: waiting times adjust more when fees are inflexible. In the end, female ob-gyns capture some but not all of the value of the preferred service they provide.

Keywords

physiciansgenderimperfect competitioncustomer discrimination

JEL Classifications

I11J16J44

Copyright information

© Eastern Economic Association 2008