Bagci, P and Perraudin, P. 1997: The impact of IMF programmes. Global Economic Institutions Working paper no. 24.
Barro, RJ and Lee, J-W. 2003: IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? Mimeo.
Benelli, R. 2003: Do IMF-supported programs boost private capital inflows? The role of program size and policy adjustment. IMF Working paper no. 03/231, Washington.Google Scholar
Bird, G. 1996: Borrowing from the IMF: The policy implications of recent empirical research. World Development 24(11): 1753–1760.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, G. 2001a: IMF programs: do they work? can they be made to work better? World Development 29(11): 1849–1865.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, G. 2001b: IMF programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer curve? World Economics 2(2): 29–49.Google Scholar
Bird, G, Hussain, M and Joyce, JP. 2004: Many happy returns? Recidivism and the IMF. Journal of International Money and Finance 23(2): 231–251.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, G and Rowlands, D. 1997: The catalytic effect of lending by the international financial institutions. World Economy 20(7): 967–991.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, G and Rowlands, D. 2001a: Catalysis or direct borrowing: The role of the IMF in mobilising private capital. World Economy 24(1): 81–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bird, G and Rowlands, D. 2001b: IMF lending: How is it affected by economic, political, and institutional factors? Journal of Policy Reform 4(3): 243–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boockmann, B and Dreher, A. 2003: The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom. European Journal of Political Economy 19(3): 633–649.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boughton, JM and Mourmouras, A. 2002:Is policy ownership an operational concept? IMF Working paper no. 02/72, Washington.Google Scholar
Conway, P. 1994: IMF lending programs: Participation and impact. Journal of Development Economics 45(2): 365–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conway, P. 2000: IMF programs and economic crisis: An empirical study of transition. Mimeo.
Conway, P. 2003. Duration and recidivism in IMF programs: Evidence from the period 1973–1992. Mimeo.
Cottarelli, C and Curzio, G. 2002: Bedfellows, hostages, or perfect strangers? Global capital markets and the catalytic effect of IMF crisis lending. IMF Working paper no. 02/193, Washington.Google Scholar
Council on Foreign Relations. 1999: Safeguarding prosperity in a global financial system: The future international financial architecture. Institute for International Economics: Washington.
De Gregorio, J, Eichengreen, B, Ito, T and Wyplosz, C. 1999: An independent and accountable IMF. International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and Centre for Economic Policy Research: Geneva, London.Google Scholar
Dell'Aricca, G, Schnabel, I and Zettelmeyer, J. 2002: Moral hazard and international crisis lending: A test. IMF Working paper no. 02/181, Washington.Google Scholar
Dicks-Mireaux, L, Mecagni, M and Schadler, S. 2000: Evaluating the effect of IMF lending to low-income countries. Journal of Development Economics 61(2): 495–526.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drazen, A. 2002: Conditionality and ownership in IMF lending: a political economy approach. IMF Staff Papers 49(0): 36–67.Google Scholar
Dreher, A. 2003: The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions. Journal of Development Studies 39(6): 101–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dreher, A. 2004a: The influence of IMF programs on the re-election of debtor governments. Economics & Politics 16(1): 53–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dreher, A. 2004b: A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality. Public Choice (in press).
Dreher, A and Vaubel, R. 2004a. The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade (in press).
Dreher, A and Vaubel, R. 2004b: Do the IMF and IBRD cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data. Open Economies Review 15(1): 5–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Easterly, W. 2003: IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs and poverty. In: Dooley, M and Frankel, JA (eds). Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets. University of Chicago: Chicago, IL. pp. 361–382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Easton, ST and Rockerbie, DW. 1999: Does IMF conditionality benefit lenders? Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(2): 347–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edwards, M. 2003a: Domestic institutions and economic performance under IMF programs, 1979–1995. Mimeo.
Edwards, M. 2003b: Signaling credibility? The IMF and catalytic finance. Mimeo.
Edwards, S and Santaella, JA. 1993: Devaluation controversies in the developing countries: Lessons from the Bretton Woods era. In: Bordo, MD and Eichengreen, B (eds). A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. pp. 405–455.Google Scholar
Ergin, E. 1999: Determinants and consequences of International Monetary Fund programs. PhD dissertation, Stanford University.
Evrensel, AY. 2002: Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance 21(5): 565–587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evrensel, AY and Kutan, AK. 2003: The IMF and creditor moral hazard and new evidence. Mimeo.
Garuda, G. 2000: The distributional effects of IMF programs: A cross-country analysis. World Development 28(6): 1031–1051.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, M. 2003: IMF structural programs. In: Feldstein, M (ed). Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies. University of Chicago: Chicago, IL. pp. 363–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldstein, M and Montiel, PJ. 1986: Evaluating fund stabilization programs with multicountry data: Some methodological pitfalls. IMF Staff Papers 33(2): 304–344.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gould, E. 2003: Money talks: supplementary financiers and International Monetary Fund conditionality. International Organization 57(3): 551–586.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haque, NU and Khan, MS. 1998: Do IMF-supported programs work? A survey of the cross-country empirical evidence. IMF working paper no. 98/169, Washington.Google Scholar
Hutchison, MM. 2003: A cure worse than the disease? Currency crises and the output costs of IMF-supported stabilization programs. In: Dooley, M and Frankel, JA (eds). Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets. University of Chicago: Chicago. pp. 321–354.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hutchison, MM and Noy, I. 2003: Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored programs in Latin America: Output costs, program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilization. Journal of International Money and Finance 22(7): 91–1014.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. 2000: Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. US Government Printing Office: Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2001a: Conditionality in fund-supported programs: overview. IMF: Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2001b: Conditionality in fund-supported programs: Policy issues. IMF: Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2001c: Conditionality in fund-supported programs. IMF: Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2001d: Trade policy conditionality in fund-supported programs. IMF: Washington.
International Monetary Fund. 2002: Evaluation of prolonged use of IMF resources. Independent Evaluation Office: Washington.
Ivanova, A, Mayer, W, Mourmouras, A and Anayiotas, G. 2003: What determines the success or failure of fund-supported programs? IMF Working paper no. 03/8, Washington.Google Scholar
Joyce, JP. 1992: The economic characteristics of IMF program countries. Economics Letters 38(2): 237–242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, JP. 2003: Promises made, promises broken: A Model of IMF program implementation. Wellesley College Economics Department Working paper no. 2003-03.
Joyce, JP. 2004: Time Present and time past: a duration analysis of IMF program spells. Review of International Economics (in press).
Kamin, SB. 2002: Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets. International Finance Discussion paper no. 736, Federal Reserve Board of Governors: Washington.
Khan, MS. 1990: The macroeconomic effects of fund-supported adjustment programs. IMF Staff Papers 37(2): 195–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Khan, MS and Sharma, S. 2001: IMF conditionality and country ownership of programs. IMF working paper no. 01/142, Washington.Google Scholar
Killick, T. 1995: IMF Programmes in developing countries. Routledge: London.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Killick, T. 1996: Principals, agents and the limitations of BWI conditionality. World Economy 19(2): 211–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Killick, T. 1997: Principals, agents and the failings of conditionality. Journal of International Development 9(4): 483–495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Killick, T, Malik, M and Manuel, M. 1992: What can we know about the effects of IMF programmes? World Economy 15(5): 575–597.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, M and Santaella, JA. 1997: Economic determinants of IMF financial arrangements. Journal of Development Economics 54(2): 405–436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, AO. 1998: Whither the World Bank and the IMF? Journal of Economic Literature 36(4): 1983–2020.Google Scholar
Lane, T and Phillips, S. 2000: Does IMF financing result in moral hazard? IMF Working paper no. 00/168, Washington.Google Scholar
Marchesi, S. 2003: Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling: an empirical analysis. Journal of Development Economics 70(2): 403–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Marchesi, S and Thomas, JP. 1999: IMF conditionality as a screening device. Economic Journal 109(454): C111–C125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayer, W and Mourmouras, A. 2002: Vested interests in a positive theory of IFI conditionality. IMF Working paper no. 02/73, Washington.Google Scholar
Mecagni, M. 1999: The causes of program interruptions. In: Bredenkamp, H and Schadler, S (eds). Economic Adjustment and Reform in Low-Income Countries. IMF: Washington. pp. 215–276.Google Scholar
Mercer-Blackman, V and Unigovskaya, A. 2000: Compliance with IMF program indicators and growth in transition economies. IMF Working paper no. 00/47, Washington.Google Scholar
Mody, A and Saravia, D. 2003: Catalyzing capital flows: Do IMF-supported programs work as commitment devices? IMF Working paper no. 03/100, Washington.Google Scholar
Mussa, M and Savastano, MA. 2000: The IMF approach to economic stabilization. In: Bernanke, BS and Rotemberg, JJ (eds). NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. pp. 79–122.Google Scholar
Oatley, T. 2002: Commercial banks and the International Monetary Fund: An empirical analysis. Mineo.
Oatley, T. and Yackee, J. 2000: Political determinants of IMF balance of payments lending: The curse of carabosse? Mimeo.
Przeworski, A and Vreeland, JR. 2000: The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. Journal of Development Economics 62(2): 385–421.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodrik, D. 1996: Why is there multilateral lending? In Bruno, M and Pleskovic, B (eds). Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. World Bank: Washington. pp. 167–193.Google Scholar
Rowlands, D. 2001: The response of other lenders to the IMF. Review of International Economics 9(3): 531–546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Santaella, JA. 1996: Stylized facts before IMF-supported macroeconomic adjustment. IMF Staff Papers 43(3): 502–544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sarno, L and Taylor, MP. 1999: Moral hazard, asset price bubbles, capital flows, and the East Asian crisis: The first tests. Journal of International Money and Finance 18(4): 637–657.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schadler, S, Bennett, A, Carkovic, M, Dicks-Mireaux, L, Mecagni, M, Morsink, JHJ and Savastano, MA. 1995: IMF conditionality: Experience under stand-by and extended arrangements. Part I: Key issues and findings. Part II: Background papers. IMF Occasional papers no. 128 and no. 129, Washington.Google Scholar
Stone, RW. 2002: Lending credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the post-communist transition. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sturm, JE, Berger, H and de Haan, J. 2002: IMF credit: How important are political factors? A robustness analysis. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research Working paper no. 642 (6). Munich.
Thacker, SC. 1999: The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics 52(1): 38–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R. 1991: The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: A public choice analysis. In: Vaubel, R and Willett, T (eds). The Political Economy of International Organizations. Westview Press: Boulder, CO. pp. 204–244.Google Scholar
Vaubel, R. 1994: The political economy of the IMF: A public choice analysis. In: Bandow, D and Vásquez, I (eds). Perpetuating Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF and the Developing World. Cato Institute: Washington, DC. pp. 37–55.Google Scholar
Vaubel, R. 1996: Bureaucracy at the IMF and World Bank: A comparison of the Evidence. World Economy 19(2): 195–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vreeland, JR. 1999: The IMF: Lender of last resort or scapegoat? Mimeo.
Vreeland, JR. 2002: The effect of IMF programs on labor. World Development 30(1): 121–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vreeland, JR. 2003. The IMF and economic development. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Willett, TD. 2001: Upping the ante for political economy analysis of the international financial institutions. World Economy 24(3): 317–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Willett, TD. 2002: Towards a broader public choice analysis of the International Monetary Fund. Mimeo.
Zhang, XA. 1999: Testing for ‘moral hazard’ in emerging markets lending. Institute of International Finance Research paper no. 99-1.