Asian Business & Management

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 333–357

CEO duality, board independence, corporate governance and firm performance in family firms: Evidence from the manufacturing industry in Malaysia

Original Article

DOI: 10.1057/abm.2014.4

Cite this article as:
Goh, C., Rasli, A. & Khan, SUR. Asian Bus Manage (2014) 13: 333. doi:10.1057/abm.2014.4

Abstract

In this study, we use the contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders to measure how internal governance mechanisms influence firm monitoring in a structure with multiple large shareholders. This extends knowledge of principal-principal conflicts and family business by introducing the moderating effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality and board independence. Using a sample of Malaysian manufacturing family firms, we find that non-dominant large shareholders rely on board independence to strengthen firm monitoring. However, family owners do not utilise CEO duality to weaken the monitoring of non-dominant large shareholders, even though they prioritise firm control to safeguard family interests.

Keywords

principal-principal conflictscontrol contestabilityboard independenceCEO dualityfamily firms

Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chin Fei Goh
    • 1
  • Amran Rasli
    • 1
  • Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Management, Universiti Teknologi MalaysiaJohorMalaysia