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On the inventors of XYZ

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Abstract

In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O.

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van Brakel, J. On the inventors of XYZ. Foundations of Chemistry 7, 57–84 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:FOCH.0000042888.33192.2e

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